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THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
. JOHN H. FANNING*
The doctrine of fair representation imposes upon labor organizations
a duty to represent fairly all members of a bargaining unit. Since its incep-
tion more than thirty years ago the duty of fair representation has gradu-
ally permeated all facets of labor and management relations. Despite count-
less attempts to define the nature and scope of the duty, it remains an un-
settled subject of scholarly debate and is ever present in litigation before
the National Labor Relations Board and the federal courts.
From my vantage point as a decisionmaker, the tasks of articulating
standards of fair representation and of identifying violations of the duty
remind me of Justice Potter Stewart's observation about obscenity: "...
perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly (defining obscenity]. But I
know it when I see it ...."' For the labor law decisionmaker, the duty of
fair representation is equally simple yet elusive.
The application of rigid standards to union conduct is inappropriate,
because judging the duty of fair representation requires balancing the
rights of individual employees against the competing interests of the union
in the concerted action and strength fostered by the collective bargaining
system. As an organization that derives strength from its constituency, a
union must respond to the needs of its membership. However, in its role as
exclusive bargaining representative, it must also consider the interests of
nonunion members in the bargaining unit in order to foster unity within
the bargaining unit. Both union and nonunion employees expect their
statutory representative to advocate their interests.
To carry out its responsibilities as bargaining representative, a union
needs autonomy. During collective bargaining negotiations, a union wants
discretion to make bargaining transactions for the greatest benefit of the
unit which may effect some employees adversely, to set priorities in de-
mands and to husband its bargaining power accordingly. Thus, a union
needs to be able to compromise employee demands without fear that its ac-
tions will result in civil liability. Such flexibility is the essence of its bargain-
ing power. To maintain this power and to promote administrative effi-
*Member of the Rhode Island and United States Supreme Court Bars; (A.B.,) Prov-
idence College: (L L. B.,) Catholic University School of Law. Member of the National Labor
Relations Board since 1957, and Chairman of the Board since April, 1977. Chairman Fanning
began his filth five-year term on the Board on December 17, 1977. He is happy to acknowl-
edge the assistance of Ms. Susan Lynn Mandle, a lawyer on his staff, in the preparation of this
paper. Ms. Mamlle is a member of the Ohio and District of Columbia Bars.
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
813
BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
ciency, a union desires similar latitude in subsequent administration of the
contract. In particular, it wants discretion over the processing of grievances,
including the decision to arbitrate. Employees, on the other hand, have for-
feited a degree of individual leverage by choosing a union to bargain for
them. In return, they are entitled to expect that the union will bargain ef-
fectively on their behalf and will not trade off their interests arbitrarily, nor
discriminate with regard to race, sex, or union membership.
Ultimately, a decisionmaker must balance employee and union inter-
ests in order to determine whether the duty of fair representation has been
breached. Although critical to unions and employees, the fair representa-
tion doctrine should be evaluated as only one component of federal law. It
stands along with the prohibition of unfair labor practices, the provision of
contractual remedies in section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, and the
scrutiny of a labor union's internal affairs under the Landrum-Griffin Act
as one element in a statutory scheme designed to effectuate the primary
purpose expressed in the NLRA: to protect the public from industrial strife
by promoting collective bargaining. Ultimately, then, the duty of fair repre-
sentation must be examined in relation to this primary purpose of federal
labor law.
In this article I shall discuss the origins of the doctrine of fair repre-
sentation and its evolution both in the Board and in the courts. In this con-
text, I shall consider the reconciliation of the Board's statutory mandate to
remedy infringement of collective bargaining rights with judicially devel-
oped standards of fair representation. I shall provide, by way of informa-
tion rather than justification, an awareness of the procedure, constraints,
and considerations with which the Board as a decisionmaker must be con-
cerned.
I. THE ORIGINS OF THE DUTY OF
FAIR REPRESENTAION
The National Labor Relations Act [NLRA or Act] does not explicitly
require that a bargaining representative fairly represent all employees in its
bargaining unit. Rather, the duty of fair representation has evolved judi-
cially to protect individual employees stripped of traditional forms of re-
dress from unfair treatment at the hands of their collective bargaining rep-
resentatives. The doctrine originated in the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroaii.2 Steele arose under the
Railway Labor Act.3 The union in Steele was the exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative of firemen employed by the Louisville & Nashville Railroad.4 As
such, the union had negotiated seniority clauses with the Louisville &
Nashville Railroad and other employers that had the purpose and effect of
placing black employees at the bottom of the seniority list.3 Likening the
powers of a statutory representative to those of a legislature — "both to
create and restrict the rights of those whom it represents" — the Court
2 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
45 U.S.C. LH 151 et seq. (1970).
323 U.S. at 194.
Id. at 195-96. Black employees were excluded from membership in the union because
it maintained discriminatory membership policies. Since the union's white members consti-
tuted a majority of firemen in the railroad's employ, black firemen were required to accept
the union as their representative. Id. at 194-95.
"Id. at 202. 	 814
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held that the Railway Labor Act implicitly imposes on a union a "duty to
exercise fairly the power conferred upon it in behalf of all those for whom
it acts ...." 7 In explaining the practical application of this duty, the Court
noted that. a statutory representative is not barred from making contracts
that have unfavorable effects on some unit employees." Such agreements,
however, must be based upon "differences relevant to the authorized pur-
poses of the contract ...."" An exclusive bargaining representative, there-
fore, must represent nonunion or minority union members "without hostile
discrimination, fairly, impartially, and in good faith."'"
The concept of fair representation enunciated in Steele was alluded to
in the context of the National Labor Relations Act in Wallace Corp. v.
NLRB," a case decided the same day as Steele. There, the Court emphati-
cally stated that the duties of a bargaining representative chosen under the
NLRA extend to all employees in a unit, and that a representative must
represent the employees' interests "fairly and impartially." 2 Hence, the
Court concluded, it was unfair for the union in Wallace to negotiate a
closed shop provision and then deny membership to a group of employees
because they previously had belonged to a rival union.' 3 Although not rely-
ing explicitly upon Steele, the Court extended the concept of "irrelevant dif-
ferences" enunciated in Steele to include differences other than race.
The Court's decision in Steele established the principle of fair repre-
sentation inherent in exclusive representative status conferred by the Rail-
way Labor Act. In its Wallace opinion, the Court intimated a two-fold
broadening of the concept of fair representation: first, an extension of the
doctrine beyond a prohibition of racial discrimination; and second, the ap-
plication of the duty of fair representation to labor organizations subject to
the NLRA. Not until its decision in Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman," however,
did the Supreme Court specifically apply the Steele standard of fair repre-
sentation to unions certified under the NLRA. In Huffman, a union which
represented a unit of employees of the Ford Motor Company negotiated a
seniority clause that gave credit to employees not only for post-
employment, but also for pre-employment, military service. 13 As a result,
some unit members were passed in seniority by members who had begun
employment with Ford later than they had, but who were credited with
Id. at 202-03. By finding a statutory basis for the duty of lair representation, the
Court avoided confronting any constitutional issues. Id. at 198-99.
° Id. at 203.
° Id.
'° Id. at 204. In a companion case to . Steele, Twist/ill v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen & Enginetnefr 323 U.S. 210 (1944), the Court held that federal courts have jurisdic-
non to entertain nondiversity suits for breach of the duty imposed by the Railway Labor Act.
Id. at 213. This conclusion was premised upon the Court's view that the right to fair repre-
sentation is a federal right implied from a federal statute. Id.
al 323 U.S. 248 (1944).
18 Id. at 255.
"M. at 256. In Wallace, the Court considered the independent. union's duty to repre-
sent unit members fairly in the context of discriminatory discharge allegations against Wallace
Corp. Id. at 250-51. The union's conduct was at issue because the Board found that it was a
"company" union which had collaborated with Wallace in order to discharge employees favor-
ing a C.I.O. union. Id. at 250.
" 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
"Id. at 331.
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prior military service." The passed employees claimed in part that the
union's acceptance of the seniority provisions exceeded its authority as a
collective bargaining representative under sections 7 and 9(a) of the
NLRA." Addressing the scope and nature of a union's authority to bargain
collectively, the Court found it limited by the union's "statutory obligation
to represent all members of an appropriate unit ... to make an honest ef-
fort to serve the interests of all of those members, without hostility to
any."'s Due to the discretionary nature of negotiation, however, the Court
perceived that a "wide range of reasonableness must be allowed a statutory
bargaining representative ..., subject always to complete good faith and
honesty of purpose. ..." Applying this standard of fair representation to
the union's negotiation of the seniority clauses in Huffman, the Court found
the credit given for pre-employment wartime military service reasonably
relevant to the purposes of the collective bargaining agreement.2° Accord-
ingly, the Court sustained the union's authority to accept these terms of the
con tract.2'
While Huffman treated the union's duty to represent its constituents
fairly in the negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement, some eleven
years later, in Humphrey v. Moore,22 the Court for the first time considered a
union's duty in the administration of a collective bargaining agreement.
The dispute in Humphrey arose after employees of one company absorbed
by another filed grievances with their union, which represented employees
in both companies." The aggrieved employees claimed that their collective
bargaining contract required the dovetailing of the seniority lists of the two
companies.24 A joint grievance committee composed of employer and
union representatives agreed and dovetailed the seniority lists.25 Since the
absorbed company was older, many of its employees obtained continued
employment to the detriment of the employees of the acquiring company."
Some of the displaced employees then brought suit in state court, success-
fully obtaining an injunction against implementation of the grievance
committee's decision.27
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the state court, relying
upon the standards set forth in Wallace and Huffman." Finding that the
union made its decision to dovetail the lists "honestly, in good faith and
without hostility or arbitrary discrimination," the Court concluded that the
union had not breached its duty of fair representation.29
Id. at 334-35.
"Id. at 332. These employees also claimed a violation of a provision of the Selective
Training and Service Act of 1940, 50 U.S.C. app. §308(b)(11) (1946), which mandated credit
only for post-employment military service.
' 345 U.S. at 337 (citations omitted).
1" Id. at 338.
2° Id. at 342.
?' Id. at 343.
22 375 U.S. 335 (1964).





"See id. at 342, 349. See text at notes 7-13 supra.
22 Id. at 350.
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The Supreme Court's decisions from Steele to Humphrey emphasize the
broad authority unions enjoy in representing their members. These deci-
sions reveal that, except in instances of discrimination based upon race and
prior union affiliation, collective bargaining representatives have the power
to balance the interests of the majority and minority within the bargaining
unit.
The struggle of employees for fair representation came to a head in
the landmark 1967 case of Vaca v. Sipes." Although Vaca was decided
twenty-three years after the Supreme Court first spoke of the duty of fair
representation in Steele, it was the first case in which the Court both specifi-
cally measured a union's duty to employees in its enforcement of contrac-
tual grievance and arbitration provisions and gave employees a cause of ac-
tion to remedy breaches of this duty. The dispute in Vaca was precipitated
by the troubles of Benjamin Owens, an employee of Swift & Company. 3 '
After he had been hospitalized for high blood pressure, Owens was cer-
tified by his family physician as fit to return to work. 32 The company's doc-
tor disagreed, and as a result Owens was permanently discharged due to
poor health. 33 Relying on his medical evidence of fitness, Owens sought his
union's help to secure reinstatement. 34 The union processed Owens' griev-
ance through four steps of the contractual grievance procedure. However,
before deciding whether to take Owens' grievance to arbitration, the fifth
and final step of the procedure, the union sent him to a second physician
to secure further medical evidence of his good health."' When the results
of this examination did not support Owens' position, the union refused to
pursue his grievance." Owens then filed suit in state court against the
union, claiming that his discharge violated the collective bargaining agree-
ment and that the union "arbitrarily, capriciously and without just or rea-
sonable cause" failed to take his grievance to arbitration.'?
The Supreme Court first concluded that state court jurisdiction over
Owens' claim against the Union was not preempted by federal labor law."
The union claimed that Owens' action arguably involved an unfair labor
practice" subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. 4° Assuming ar-
guendo the existence of NLRB jurisdiction over fair representation claims,
the Court held that pursuant to section 301 of the Labor Management Re-
lations Act, 4 ' both state and federal courts have jurisdiction concurrent
with the Board to resolve issues of fair representation. 42 Nevertheless, the









39 The Board first articulated this approach to breaches of the duty of fair representa-
tion in Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 51 L.R.R.M. 1584 (1962), enforcement denied, 326
F.2d 172, 54 L.R.R.M. 2715 (2d Cir. 1963), For a complete discussion of Miranda and its
progeny see text notes 148-98 infra.
4° 386 U.S. at 183-84.
41 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
42 386 U.S. at 184. While the Court referred specifically to jurisdiction under § 301 of
the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), it did not preclude other bases of jurisdiction
over fair representation suits. Id.
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Court reasoned, the availability of a judicial forum for breach of contract
claims does not alter an employee's responsibility to exhaust exclusive con-
tractual grievance and arbitration procedures." The Court concluded,
however, that this requirement is waived when an employer repudiates the
contractual procedures, or when a union, having sole power to invoke the
procedures, refuses to do so wrongfully. 44
Positing that Owens' claim was a federal common law claim, the Court
defined the union conduct proscribed by the duty of fair representation as
only conduct which is "arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith.' Cir-
cumscribing the application of these standards to the process of contract
administration, the Court explained that its scrutiny of arbitrary or per-
functory union conduct did not signify that an employee has an absolute
right to have his grievance arbitrated." In the instant case, the Court con-
cluded, the union's decision to forego arbitration was not arbitrary, dis-
criminatory or made in bad faith, but rather was justifiable in light of the
conflicting medical evidence with respect to Owens' health. 47
The decision in Vaca emerged as a watershed in the development of
federal labor law governing the duty of fair representation. In Huffman
and Humphrey, the Court had created a federal common law duty of fair
representation based upon a union's status as exclusive bargaining agent
under the NLRA. In Vaca, the Court confirmed the existence of a cause of
action for breach of this duty under section 301 of the LMRA Elaborating
upon the nature of such a section 301 action, the Court announced that if
employees have delegated to the union exclusive authority to invoke the
grievance machinery, in order to prevail against an employer in a suit for
wrongful discharge under section 301 an employee first must prove that
his union breached its duty of fair representation in presenting his griev-
ance." Additionally, the Court expanded the standards of fair representa-
tion to include not only discrimination and bad faith, but also arbitrary
conduct."
Since Vaca, the Supreme Court has considered further the procedural
mechanics of fair representation suits under section 301 but has not fully
clarified the substantive standards of the fair representation duty itself. In






48 /d. at 186.
"See id. at 190, 191, 194.
" 403 U.S. 274 (1971). In Lorkridge, an employee brought suit against his union in state
court after he was terminated from union membership, and consequently discharged (ruin his
employment pursuant to a union security clause. Id. at 279. There, as in Vaca, the central issue
was whether state court jurisdiction was preempted on the ground that the union's action was
arguably an withiir labor practice. /d. at 285. In contrast to its decision in Vaca, the Court con-
cluded that state coon jurisdiction was preempted. Id. at 285-91. To counter the employee's
assertion that he stated a Clain) against the union for breach of its duty of fair representation,
the Court pointed out that the employee had not controverted the state courts finding that
the union has not intentionally misinterpreted the security clause. Id. at 300. As a result, the
Court reasoned that the employee had not presented a claim within the exception to the
preemption doctrine carved out for fair representation suits by Vaca, where the Court stated
proof of "arbitrary or bad-faith conduct on the part of the Union" is required. Id. at 299
(quoting Vaca, 386 U.S. at 193).
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doubt on the viability of Vaca's arbitrariness standard when it noted that
there must be "substantial evidence of fa union's] fraud, deceitful action or
dishonest conduct" to support a fair representation claim." Most recently,
however, in the 1975 case of Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc." the Court
appeared to reaffirm Vaca's prohibition of arbitrary or perfunctory union
conduct.53 At the same time, the Court did not attempt to resolve whether
arbitrary conduct encompasses negligent conduct." With greater clarity
than the Vaca Court, the Hines Court provided a necessary counterbalance
" Id. at 299 (quoting Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 348 (1964)); This quoted Ian.
gunge prompted some courts of appeals to conclude that bad faith is an element of a fair rep-
resentation claim and that arbitrary conduct alone therefore does not constitute a breach of
the duty of fair representation. Cannon v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 524 F.2d 290, 293,
90 L.R.R.M. 2996, 2998 (7th Cir. 1975); Suissa v. American Export Lines, Inc., 507 F.2r1 1343,
1347, 88 L.R.R.M. 2262, 2264-65 (2d Cir. 1974); Woods v. North American Rockwell Corp„
480 F.2d 644, 648 (10th Cir. 1973). At the same time, however, the Loehridge court reasoned
that conduct which demonstrates a failure of fair representation must be "deliberate and se-
verely hostile and irrational .... 403  U.S. at 301 (emphasis added). Relying upon this am-
biguous reference to "irrational conduct", several circuit courts have concluded that Locbidge
does not signal a ref real from the arbitrariness standard enunciated in Vara. RuziCka v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306, 309-10, 90 L.R.R.M. 2497, 2499-500 (5th Cir. 1975); Bores
v. Houston Symphony Soc'y, 503 F.2d 842, 843-44, 87 L.R.R.M. 3124, 3124-25 (5th Cir.
1974); Renault v. Local 40, Intl Longshoremen, 501 F.2d 258, 264, 87 L.R.R.M. 2070, 2073-
74 (9th Cir. 1974); Griffin v. UAW, 469 F.2d 181, 183, 81 L.R.R.M. 2485, 2486 (4th Cir.
1972); Smith v. PitLsburgh Gage 8c Supply Co., 464 F.2d 870, 875, 80 L.R.R.M. 3208, 3212
(3d Cir. 1972).
52 429 U.S. 554 (1976). Hines involved three employees who were discharged for al-
legedly falsifying expense vouchers presented to the employer to cover expenses on the over-
the-road trucking assignment. Id, at 556. A joint grievance committee consisting of both em-
ployer and union representatives sustained the discharge in an arbitration decision considered
as final and binding under the contract. Id. at 557. After the adverse decision the employees
brought suit in federal district court against the employer and the union, claiming that the
union failed to make an investigation which would have exculpated them. Id. at 558. In oppos-
ition to the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the employees presented a deposition
of a motel clerk who admitted falsifying the expense vouchers for his own purposes. Although
the district court dismissed the complaint against all parties because of the binding and final
committee decision, the court of appeals reinstated as to the union on grounds that sufficient
facts might be found in a trial which would indicate that the union acted in bad faith or arbi-
trarily. Id. at 559-60. The Supreme Court in Hines ultimately reinstated the complaint against
the employer, Id. zu 560-61.
"Id. at 568-69 (citing Vat:a, 386 U.S. tit 191).
Only the Sixth Circuit has held that negligent conduct may fall within Vaca's proscrip-
tion of arbitrary conduct. Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306, 310, 90 L.R.R.M.
2497, 2500 (6th Cir. 1975). Other circuits as well as the National Labor Relations Board have
declined to find breaches of the duty of fair representation based upon union negligence. See,
e.g., Augsporger v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 510 F.2d 853, 859, 88 L.R.R.M,
2609, 2612-13 (8th Cir. 1975). Accord, Barton Brands, Ltd. v. NLRB, 529 Ea! 793, 789-99, 91
L.R.R.M. 2241, 2244-45 (7th Cir. 1976).
In a subsequent opinion denying a rehearing en bane in Ruzigka, the United States
Court of Appeals for die Sixth Circuit limited the holding of the case to instances of "un-
explained uniim inaction" that have barred employees from access to grievance procedures.
528 F.2c1 912, 913, 91 L.R.R.M. 3054, 3054 (6th Cir. 1975)(denial of petition for rehearing en
banc). To this end, the standard announced in Ruzicka resembles the standard of rational
decision-making prescribed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
NLRB v. General Truck Dryers, Local 315,545 F.2d 1173, 1175, 93 L.R.R.M. 2747, 2749
(9th Cir. 1976), rather than a negligence standard. Some commentattds, however, read
as bringing the Court "doser to considerations of negligence as a stand:DA by which union be-
havior will be evaluated." Jones, The Origin of the Concept of the Duty of Fair Representation, in
Tut: Dun OF FAIR REPRESENTATION: PAPERS FROM THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE DUTY or
FAIR REPRESENTATION 41-42 (Cornell University 1977).
819
BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
to Vaal's requirement that an employee prove a fair representation viola-
tion by his union in order to prevail in a section 301 action against his em-
ployer. The Court held that an employer who believes in good faith he has
grounds for a discharge may be liable for breaching a bargaining agree-
ment even though the discharge has been upheld in arbitration if the
union breached its duty to represent the employee fairly in'that arbitration
procedure.55
In Steele and its progeny,56 the Supreme Court sketched only the
broad outline of the duty of fair representation without much substantive
and procedural content. These broad strokes left undefined the scope of
the duty of fair representation in the context of proceedings before the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board as opposed to proceedings arising under sec-
tion 301 of the LMRA or the Railway Labor Act. Thus, the Board has had
to consider whether the NLRA imposes a duty of fair representation upon
unions certified under section 957 and whether the Board has the statutory
authority to enforce such a duty. Moreover, the Board has had to formu-
late standards of fair representation, a task which continues today. Despite
the existence of statutory language in the NLRA capable of safeguarding
employees against unfair conduct by their bargaining representatives, the
Board has relied partially upon the judicially developed doctrine of fair
representation to provide this protection. The next section of this article
will examine how the Board has incorporated this federal common law doc-
trine into the area of statutorily defined unfair practices and will consider
how the Board might achieve similar results within the bounds of its statu-
tory rnandate.
IL THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
That some form of a fair representation duty inheres in the NLRA
was implicit in the Steele Court's derivation of the duty as a corollary of a
union's exclusive bargaining status." The Court then went on to recognize
this implication in its description of the duties of a bargaining agent under
the NLRA in Wallace.59 The Board, therefore, had little trouble recognizing
that a duty of fair representation exists on the part of the unions it cer-
tifies.60 We have struggled, however, to determine our authority to remedy
a union's breach of this duty. This struggle continues today.
The Board has developed two approaches to fair representation
issues, depending on whether the issues arise in proceedings previous to
certification of a bargaining agent or in unfair labor practice proceedings
after establishment of collective bargaining. Each of these contexts has
yielded different questions concerning the Board's authority to regulate
fair union representation.
55 424 U.S. at 571-72.
" See text at notes 2-29 supra.
57 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1970).
"See Steele, 323 U.S. at 202-03
59 Wallace, 323 U.S. at 255-56.
"See, e.g., Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.II. 181, 51 L.R.R.M. 1584 (1962, enforcement
denied, 326 F.2d 172, 54 L.R.R.M. 2715 (2d Cir. 1963); Hughes Tool Co. [Hughes Tool 11, 104
N.L.R.B. 318, 32 L.R.R.M. 1010 (1953); Larus & Bros., 62 N.L.R.B. 1075, 16 L.R.R.M. 242
(1945).
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A. Representation Proceedings
The fair representation issue initially surfaced in Board representa-
tion proceedings just one year after the Supreme Court's decision in Steele.
In Larus & Brothers,"' the Board was asked to revoke its certification of a
whites-only union. Citing its own precedents as well as Steele and its pro-
geny, 62 the Board recognized the duty of a statutory bargaining repre-
sentative to represent all members of a bargaining unit without discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, color, or creed." The Board asserted its power to
uphold this duty by revoking the certification of a union which breaches
it."
The Board reaffirmed and expanded this formulation of the fair rep-
resentation duty in its 1953 decision in Hughes Tool Co. [Hughes Tool I]." In
Hughes Tool I, an all-white certified local union required a fee from the
mostly black nonmembers of fifteen dollars for each grievance proceeding
and four hundred dollars for each arbitration proceeding handled by the
union. Another union, seeking to oust the certified local, filed a motion
with the Board to revoke the local's certification on grounds that the fees
conflicted with the local's duty to represent employees in grievance pro-
ceedings without discrimination."" A majority of the Board agreed," and
held that it would revoke the union's certification if the unfair conduct
were not ceased immediately."
For several years after Hughes Tool I, revocation of certification was
the Board's only weapon for a fair representation violation. In its 1962 de-
cision in Pioneer Bus Co.," however, the Board added a similar, less drastic
weapon. In Pioneer Bus, a decision in which I participated, the Board de-
clined to invoke its discretionary contract bar rules.'" While racially segre-
gated into two locals, 7 ' except for different seniority provisions, the cer-
tified union had negotiated identical bargaining agreements. When the
union and the employer sought, under existing contract bar rules, to bar a
representation election petition by a rival union, the Board unanimously
refused. 72 Finding that the racial segregation as well as the different senior-
ity provisions for different races violated the union's duty of fair repre-
sentation, the Board perceived grounds to revoke the union's certification.
" 62 N.L.R.B. 1075, 16 L.R.R.M. 242 (1945).
° 2 1d. at 1083, 16 L.R.R.M. at 244, citing Carter Mfg. Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 804. 15 L.R.R.M.
164 (1944) decided 9 days before Sleek: Bethlehem-Alameda Shipyard, Inc., 53 N.L.R.B. 999,
13 L.R.R.M. 139 (1943). It is interesting to note that the Board and the Supreme Court
reached the conclusion that a statutory bargaining agent is under a duty of fair representation
almost simultaneously. In fact, it may well be that the Supreme Court relied upon the Board's
Bethlehem-Alameda decision in formulating the duty; that Board case was cited in Th wgood
Marshall's brief amicus curiae in Steele. Brief for the NAACI', Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323
U.S. 192 (1944) (brief can he found at 89 L. Ed. 191, 191).
" 62 N.L.R.B. at 1083, 16 L.R.R.M. at 244.
61 Id. at 1085, 16 L.R.R.M. at 244.
" 104 N.L.R.B. 318, 32 L.R.R.M. 1010 (1953).
"Id. at 318-19, 32 I..R.R.M. at 1010.
° Id at 329-30, 32 L.R.R.M. at 1013.
""Id. In its remedy the Board declined to revoke cenilication, and instead gave the
union an opportunity to discontinue the offending grievance processing change. Id.
60 140 N.L.R.B. 54, 51 L.R.R.M. 1546 (1962).
"Id. at 55, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1546.
n M. at 54-55, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1546.
"Id.
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This remedy, however, was deemed unnecessary in view of the rival union's
request for an immediate election."
In Lana and Pioneer Bus, the Board established the basic approach to
fair representation questions which it took for twenty years and which sur-
vives today.74 Under this approach, the Board would review in representa-
tion proceedings only claims of an already certified bargaining repre-
sentative's actual breach of its duty of fair representation. This review
would seek to determine whether the union had discriminated invidiously
or hostilely against a minority of employees" and adversely affected the
minority's employment relationship or rights guaranteed by the NLRA."
In Hughes Tool I, the Board expanded this approach to include along with
discrimination based on race, creed, or color, discrimination based on
union membership." The Hughes Tool I Board also held for the first time
that the duty of fair representation applies not only to the negotiation of a
collective bargaining contract, but also to the contract's administration."
Thus, the Board in Hughes Tool I began to broaden the scope of the duty
of fair representation to cover a range of union activities previously consid-
ered immune from Board examination."
The Board's initial approach to fair representation issues, even as ex-
panded by Hughes Tool I, stemmed from its interpretation of the duty of
fair representation as a direct corollary of the exclusive bargaining status
which section 9 accords a certified union. The Board's authority to remedy
breaches of the duty of fair representation in turn stems from the Board's
authority to protect that exclusive status. Thus, the Board's factual inquiry
remains narrow, limited to a search for hostile or discriminatory union rep-
resentations which adversely affect the terms and conditions of employ-
men 80
More recently, the Board has searched for a broader, constitutional
basis for dealing with unions alleged to have discriminated on the basis of
race, national origin, or sex." This search has taken the Board's fair repre-
at 55,51 L.R.R.M. 1546.
"See, e.g., Handy Andy, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 447, 454, 94 L.R.R.M. 1354, 1361 (1977).
75 E.g., Pioneer Bus Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 54, 51 L.R.R.M. 1546 (1962); Hughes Tool I, 104
N.L.R.B. 318, 32 1...R.R.M. 1010 (1953).
"E.g., Pioneer Bus Co., 140 N.L.R,B. 54, 51 L.R.R.M. 1546 (1962); Larus & Bros.. 62
N.L.R.B. 1075, 16 L.R.R.M. 242 (1945).
77 104 N.L.R.B. at 326,32 L.R.R.M. 1011.
"Id. at 326-27,32 L.R.R.M. at 1011 (citing Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB, 147 F.2d 69, 15
L.R.R.M. 852 (5th Cir. 1945)). The Board reasoned that grievance presentation and adjust-
ment is an important part of the representation of etnployees under § 9(a). Thus, a union has
a duty to accept and process impartially and without discrimination, all grievances by any
employees it represents. 104 N.L.R.B. at 326-27, 32 L.R.R.M. at 1011. The Board concluded
that the proviso to § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970), added in 1947, which granted individual
employees in a unit represented by a certified union the right to present grievances to the
employer, did not diminish a certified union's responsibility concerning grievances on which
its aid has been requested. 104 N.L.R.B. at 327, 32 L.R.R.M. at 1012.
"See Hughes Tool!, 104 N.L.R.B. at 331, 32 L.R.R.M. at 1016 (Chairman Herzog and
Member Peterson, dissenting). See also Independent Metal Workers Union Local 1 (Hughes
Tool H], 147 N.L.R.B. 1573, 1589, 56 L.R.R.M. 1289, 1299 (1964) (Chairman McCulloch and
Member Fanning, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
"See Hughes Tool!, 104 N.L.R.B. at 326, 32 L.R.R.M. at 1011 (quoting Bethlehem Steel
Co., Shipbuilding Division, 89 N.L.R.B. 341, 344, 25 L.R.R.M. 1564, 1566 (1950)).
"See Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944), where the Court stated: "If, as
the state court has held, the Act confers this power [of negotiating discriminatory contracts]
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sentation inquiry beyond the boundaries of the NLRA. Indeed, a union's
duty of fair representation has overlapped its obligations under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 82 The search for a constitutional basis had
its origin in Independent Metal Workers Union Local I [Hughes Tool
where the Board for the first time revoked a union's certification for a
breach of its duty of fair representation. In Hughes Tool II the Board was
confronted with two complaints against the same all-white union involved
in the Hughes Tool I decision." Together with an all-black local, this union
had been certified as a joint bargaining representative." To eliminate racial
discrimination in the negotiation of job opportunities within the company,
the black local filed a motion with the Board to rescind the joint certifica-
tion. An individual member of the black local simultaneously filed an un-
fair labor practice complaint against the white local for failing to process
his grievance."
In the representation case, a three member majority of the Board, re-
lying on Pioneer Bus," held that the previous certification should be re-
scinded because the certified locals "executed contracts based on race and
administered the contracts so as to perpetuate racial discrimination in
employment." 88 The majority added a constitutional gloss to the Pioneer Bus
doctrine. In their view, the Board cannot afford the protection of section 9
to a statutory bargaining representative which discriminates racially without
itself discriminating unconstitutionally."
Chairman McCulloch and I concurred in the recission of certification,
but opposed the majority's constitutional rationale." We believed it un-
necessary, and perhaps inappropriate, to define constitutional limitations
on the Board's section 9 powers. In our view, it was enough that contracts
patently discriminatory in the terms and conditions of employment
negotiated by the certified union and the employer violated the duty aris-
ing from section 9. 8 ' Hence we would have rested the decision squarely on
the NLRA.
In the early 1970's employers began to challenge union petitions for
elections based on allegations that the union seeking certification invidi-
ously discriminated against employees in the bargaining unit. These chal-
lenges arose before the unions were certified as exclusive bargaining repre-
sentatives, a time when the duty of fair representation concomitant with
that status had not arisen. The employers nevertheless contended that the
Board was constitutionally precluded from certifying these unions in view
on the bargaining representative of a craft or class of employees without any commensurate
statutory duty toward its members, constitutional questions arise." Id. at 198.
82 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1970 & Stipp. V 1975).
83 147 N.L.R.B. 1573, 56 L.R.R.M. 1289 (1964).
84 See notes 65-68 supra.
"Id. at 1578, 56 L.R.R.M. at 1290.
"Id. at 1579, 56 L.R.R.M. at 1290.
87 140 N.L.R.B. 54, 51 L.R.R.M. 1546 (1962). See text at notes 70-73 supra.
"" 147 N.L.R.B. at 1566, 56 L.R.R.M. at 1294,
" Id. (citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24
(1948); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
99 147 N.L.R.B. at 1579, 56 L.R.R.M. at 1295.
"Id. (citing Pioneer Bus Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 54, 51 L.R.R.M. 1546 (1962)).
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of their discriminatory practices." In 1974, in Bekins Moving & Storage
Co.," three members of the Board accepted this contention.
In Bekins, the employer contended that a union should be barred
from a representation election because it discriminated on the basis of sex
and national origin." To resolve this issue, framed as a challenge to the
union's capacity to represent unit employees fairly, a plurality of the Board
employed a constitutional approach similar to that in Hughes Tool 11.
Former Chairman Miller and Member Jenkins reasoned that Board certifi-
cation of a discriminatory union violates the due process clause of the fifth
amendment to the Constitution." In their view, when the NLRB, as a fed-
eral instrumentality, certifies a union which has shown a "propensity to fail
fairly to represent employees," it unconstitutionally furthers invidious pri-
vate discrimination." Thus, former Chairman Miller and Member Jenkins
believed that the Constitution compels the Board to investigate allegations
of union membership discrimination and to evaluate a union's willingness
and capacity to represent employees on a fair and equal basis.° 7
 Accord-
ingly, they concluded that the Board should grant a precertification inquiry
into the employer's pre-election discrimination charges if the union sub-
sequently wins the election and the employer raises his objections within
five days of the vote tally."
Former Member Kennedy concurred in the majority's constitutional
approach. He agreed that the Board is constitutionally foreclosed from cer-
tifying a union that discriminates on the "inherently suspect" basis of race,
alienage or national origin." He nevertheless opposed the inquiry into
whether a union has a "propensity" for unfair representation. Such inquiry,
he reasoned, inappropriately incorporates into the constitutional precertifi-
cation inquiry issues of' fair representation properly treated after certifica-
tion.'" Since a majority did not endorse the broader precertification test
favored by former Chairman Miller and Member Jenkins, Member Ken-
nedy's view was the common ground of Bekins.
Member Penello and I dissented from this view. We concluded that
the Constitution does not require and the NLRA does not permit the
Board to withhold certification because of a union's alleged discriminatory
practices.'°' We pointed out that:
[C]ertification ... will give members of the bargaining unit rights
enforceable not only under the Act, but under the Civil Rights
"E.g., Office & Professional Employees International Union, Local 2, 199 N.L.R.B.
728, 81 L.R.R.M. 1305 (1972) (sex discrimination); Bookbinders & Bindery Workers Union,
Local 144, 197 N.L.R.B. 246, 80 L.R.R.M. 1294 (1972) (sex discrimination); Retail Clerks
Local 588, 194 N.L.R.B. 1135, 79 L.R.R.M. 1163 (1972) (religious discrimination).
93 211 N.L.R.B. 138, 86 L.R.R.M. 1323 (1974), noted in Annual Survey of Labor Relations
& Employment Discrimination Lour, 16 B.C. INn. & Com. L. REV. 965, 986 (1975).
04 211 N.L.R.B. at 138, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1324.
"Id. at 138-39, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1325. A similar constitutional rationale had been enun-
ciated previously by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in NLRB v.
Mansion House Center Management Co., 473 F.2(1 471, 82 L.R.R.M. 2608 (8th Cir. 1973).
"" 211 N.L.R.B. at 139, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1326.
" Id.
" Id, at 141-42, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1328.
n M. at 143, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1329.
""'Id at 144, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1330.
'"' Id. at 145-46, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1331-32.
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Act as well, and in law suits arising under the laws of the United
States.
The rights which may be enforced by minority members of
the bargaining unit against their exclusive representative include,
of course, the right to be represented fairly and without hostility
or discrimination. Among those rights also is the right to partici-
pate in the affairs of the exclusive representative, including the
right to be admitted to membership.'"
Under such circumstances, we reasoned that certification does not operate
to support a union's discriminatory practices. Rather, it places minority
groups within the bargaining unit in a position to challenge discriminatory
practices in proceedings before the Board or other federal forums.'°3 We
also argued that it is beyond the authority of the Board to withhold certifi-
cation. Nowhere in the NLRA is there express or implied power to with-
hold certification for reasons other than election irregularities. On the con-
trary, section 9(c)(1) requires the Board to certify a union which has won a
fairly conducted representation election."4 To do otherwise, we noted,
would deny employees their section 7 right to bargain collectively through
their chosen representative.'" Moreover, "[ably defects in the certification
which may flow from the [union's) allegedly discriminatory membership
policies are subject to review in proceedings which may arise under Section
10 of the Act,"°8 whereas withholding certification might leave the offend-
ing practices untouched.'" We concluded that a precertification inquiry
into a union's qualifications is unwarranted on constitutional or statutory
grounds, and we maintained that the issue of a union's fair representation
should be considered in other proceedings under the Act but only after
certification.'"
102 Id. at 146, 86 L.R.R,M, at 1332.
103 Id.
'" 29 U.S.C. 	 159(c)(1) (1970) provides:
Whenever a petition shall have been filed, in accordance with such regu-
lations as may be prescribed by the Board-
(A) by an employee or group of employees or any individual
or labor organization acting in their behalf alleging that a substantial
number of employees (i) wish to be represented for collective bar-
gaining and that their employer declines to recognize their repre-
sentative as the representative defined in subsection (a) of this sec-
tion, or (ii) assert that the individual or labor organization, which
has been certified or is being currently recognized by their employer
as the bargaining representative, is no longer a representative as de-
fined in subsection (a) of this section; or
(B) by an employer, alleging that one or more individuals or
labor organizations have presented to him a claim to be recognized
as the representative defined in subsection (a) of this section;
the Board shall investigate such petition and if it has reasonable cause to believe
that a question of representation affecting commerce exists shall provide for an
appropriate hearing upon due notice. Such hearing may be conducted by an of-
ficer or employee of the regional office, who shall not make any recom-
mendations with respect thereto. If the Board finds upon the record of such
hearing that such a question of representation exists, it shall direct an election by
secret ballot and shall certify the results thereof.
101 211 N.L.R.B. at 148,86 L.R.R.M. at 1334.
106 Id.
"'Id. at 147,86 L.R.R.M. at 1333-34.
"mid. at 148, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1334-35.
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Constitutional theory surfaced during the same year as Bekins in Bell
& Howell Co.'" In that case, an employer filed a post-election motion to
disqualify a union from certification on grounds that the union engaged in
sex discrimination. As in Bekins, the Board was split; this time, however,
Member Penello and I were in the majority. We restated our view that the
Board can resolve in proceedings other than certification proceedings any
question concerning a union's willingness and capacity to represent bargain-
ing unit employees,"° and we adhered to our position that precertification
inquiry into such questions is not constitutionally required."' Member
Kennedy concurred in denying the employer a precertification hearing."2
Although Member Kennedy reaffirmed his constitutional reasoning in Be-
kins, he distinguished Bell & Howell on the ground that the sex discrimina-
tion alleged in that case, unlike discrimination based on race, alienage, and
national origin, is not constitutionally suspect."3 Accordingly, certification
of the union in the present case was not constitutionally barred.
Chairman Miller and Member Jenkins dissented, echoing their reason-
ing in Bekins."4 They argued that a precertification hearing should have
been held to consider the employer's evidence of sex discrimination chal-
lenging the union's ability to represent employees fairly."5 Thus, Bell &
Howell, in limiting Bekins to constitutionally suspect classifications, clarified
that the Bekins doctrine would not lead to a wideranging precertification
inquiry into a union's willingness or capacity for future fair representation.
Last year, we narrowed the scope of precertification consideration of
fair representation issues still further. In Handy Andy, we expressly
overruled Bekins. The Be/ins dissenters, Member Penello and I, joined by
then Chairman Murphy, with Member Walther concurring, became the
majority in Handy Andy. In that case, an employer objected to certification
of a union on the basis of several federal court decisions which had held
that the challenged union's bargaining agreements with other employers
constituted employment discrimination.'" The employer contended that
these decisions demonstrated that the union would invidiously exclude per-
sons from membership and that the union had a propensity to discriminate
in employee representation."8 Handy Andy thus presented the Board with
an opportunity to reevaluate the constitutional doctrine set forth in Be/ins.
The Board in Handy Andy viewed Be/ins as grounded on a dated
analysis of Supreme Court decisions concerning unconstitutional govern-
mental action. The Board looked to more recent Supreme Court decisions
which indicated that "where the impetus for the discrimination is private,
ma 213 N.L.R.B. 407, 87 L.R.R.M. 1172 (1974), noted in Annual Survey of Labor Relations
and Employment Discrimination Law, 16 B.C. IND. & CONE L. REV. 965, 986-92 (1975).
110 213 N.L.R.B. at 408, 87 L.R.R.N1. at 1174.
"2 Id.
"Id. (citing Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974)); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351
(1974).
Bell & Howell Co., 213 N.L.R.B. 407, 409, 87 L.R.R.M. 1172, 1175, (1974).
228 N.L.R.B. 447,94 L.R.R.M. 1354 (1977), noted in Annual Survey of Labor Relations
and Employment Discrimination Law, 18 B.C. IND. AND CON]. L. REV. 1045, 1103 (1977).
In 228 N.L.R.B. at 447-48, 94 L.R.RAL at 1355. See, e.g., Rodriguez V. East Texas
Motor Freight, 505 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, 431 U.S. 395, 406 (1977).
"8 228 N.L.R.B. at 447,94 L.R.R.M. at 1355.
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the [governmental agent] must have 'significantly involved itself with invidi-
ous discriminations' ... in order for the discriminatory action to fall within
the ambit of the constitutional prohibition." 119 Accordingly, the Board rea-
soned that governmental involvement with a private party which discrimi-
nates, without more is not proscribed by the Constitution."° Thus, the
legal issue presented by a precertification claim of union discrimination is
whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the Board's certification
processes and any discrimination undertaken by a certified union. The
Board in Handy Andy concluded that there is not."'
This conclusion stemmed from the nature of certification. NLRB cer-
tification, while conferring substantial benefits on a union, does not en-
force, require, or encourage a union's discriminatory practices.' 22 It does
not permit unions to engage in discriminatory practices otherwise prohib-
ited either by the duty of fair representation 123 or Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. 124 Rather, certification by the Board is a routine ac-
knowledgement that a majority of employees in a bargaining unit duly have
selected the union as their exclusive bargaining representative. 125 Thus, in
the Handy Andy Board's view, NLRB certification is a facially neutral act
which does not "significantly involve" the Board with any labor organiza-
tion discrimination. Hence, it does not rise to the level of unconstitutional
governmental action. Accordingly, the Board in Handy Andy held that de-
nial of certification of an allegedly discriminatory union is not consti-
tutionally required. 126
The Board in Handy Andy also considered whether denial of certifica-
tion for breaches of the duty of fair representation is nevertheless appro-
priate under the NLRA. The crux of this issue was whether an allegation
of a breach of fair representation should be considered in representation
proceedings, unfair labor practice proceedings, or both. In resolving this
question, the Board first examined the certification requirements detailed
in 9(c)(1) of the Act. The Board reasoned that the mandatory language of
that section commands the NLRB in a representation proceeding to issue
certification to a labor organization which has won a valid election. 127 The
only remedies available for an election found invalid are to set the election
aside or to direct a second election. Hence, the Board concluded, its only
""Id. at 450, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1357 (quoting Moose Lodge No. 107 v. lrvis, 407 U.S.
163, 173 (1973) (emphasis supplied by Board). The Bekins Board had relied on Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. I (1948), in which judicial enforcement of a racially restrictive private cov-
enant was held to be unconstitutional governmental action.
"° 228 N.L.R.B. at 450, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1357.
'" Id.
122 Id.
"'The Board reasoned that the duty of fair representation "specifically prohibits" a
union from practicing unlawful discrimination against any unit member. Id. at 450, 94
L.R.R.M. at 1358.
184 Title VII provides that it is an unlawful employment practice for a labor organiza-
tion to exclude any individual from membership or otherwise adversely affect an employee's
status on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(c) (Supp.
V 1975).
5 228 N.L.R.B. at 450, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1357 (citing Alto Plastics Mfg. Corp., 136
N.L.R.B. 850, 851, 49 L.R.R.M. 1867, 1867 (1962).
I26 228 N.L.R.B. at 448, 450, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1355, 1357.
1P5 Id. at 452, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1359.
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duty under section 9(c)(l) is to ensure the fairness of elections. Accord-
ingly, it lacks authority to consider in representation proceedings the po-
tential future consequences of union discrimination.'22
The Board found this conclusion buttressed by Congress' desire that
representation questions be resolved expeditiously to advance the statutory
objectives of fostering collective bargaining and assuring stability in labor-
management relations. To that end, Congress denied direct judicial review
of representation proceedings and exempted such proceedings from the
Administrative Procedure Act." Similarly, Congress provided that repre-
sentation questions be decided in nonadversary factfinding proceedings.'3°
This choice of procedure for certification suggests a congressional percep-
tion that the importance of permitting employees to decide expeditiously
whether they desire a particular bargaining representative justifies elimi-
nation of adversarial procedural safeguards. In this light, the Board recog-
nized, it should not deny or delay the majority's choice of a bargaining rep-
resentative.13'
The Board contrasted the streamlined procedures established for cer-
tification matters with the NLRA's provisions for unfair labor practice pro-
ceedings.'32 Rather than delaying the onset of collective bargaining, the un-
fair labor practice provisions protect the rights of employees to organize
and bargain through representatives of their own choosing. To this end,
the Act grants the Board broad remedial powers including reinstatement
and backpay orders,'33 to prevent unfair labor practices. Such remedies are
imposed only after an adversary proceeding which accords the full due
process panoply of a formal complaint framing the issues, a hearing before
an administrative law judge, confrontation of witnesses, and the right of
review in the circuit courts of appeals.'34 Since deferring consideration of
fair representation questions permits thorough adjudication of those issues
and speeds the collective bargaining process, the Board in Handy Andy con-
cluded that an unfair labor practice proceeding is the most appropriate
forum for resolving fair representation issues.'35
Despite its preference for adjudicating fair representation questions in
unfair labor practice proceedings, the Board clarified that it was not ruling
out issues of union discrimination from representation proceedings al-
together. The Board unequivocally stated that it will continue to consider
discrimination issues where required to preserve the integrity of its own
" Id.
"Id, at 454,94 L.R.R.M. at 1361 (citing AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401, 409-lI (1940)).
See Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.s. 184, 188.91 (1958) (representation proceedings can be reviewed
n federal court only to consider whether the Board acted in excess of its statutory authority
and contray to a specific prohibition in the NLRA).
" 228 N.L.ttE. at 454, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1361.
"Id. at 454,94 L.R.R.M. at 1361.
"Id. at 454,94 L.R.R.M. at 1361.
"Id. See, e.g., IBEW, Local 2088 (Federal Electric Corp.), 218 N.L.R.B. 396, 397, 89
LR.R.M. 1590, 1592 (1975) (union required to treat employee as promoted and make him
whole for loss of earnings which resulted from union's failure to process his grievance con-
cerning promotion).
"4See 228 N.L.R.B. at 454, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1361. These procedures parallel those re-
quired under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e fl seq. (1970 &
Supp. V 1975).
'" 228 N.L.R.B. at 454,94 L.R.R.M. at 1361.
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processes.'"" Thus, for example, the Board will consider "the possible im-
pact of clearly existing invidious discrimination within the unit at issue or
of appeals to prejudice directed at employees ...." 137 Discrimination could
form the basis for recission of certification or lifting of contract-bar rules;
an election appeal to prejudice could undermine the validity of a repre-
sentation election and require a second election.' 38
The Board in Handy Andy stated that it would consider all other
claims of discriminatory practices by a union in the context of unfair labor
practice proceedings.'" The Handy Andy decision thus sets out in boldface
the Board's current approach to fair representation issues in representation
proceedings. A majority of the Board now believes no constitutional or
statutory considerations require or warrant withholding certification of a
union duly selected as exclusive representative of a bargaining unit. 14 ° At
the same time, all the Board's members hold that employees have a right to
be free from invidious discrimination by their bargaining representative. 14 '
A majority believes this right does not arise until the union actually repre-
sents employees in a specific bargaining unit. Thus, a majority holds that
litigation concerning the duty in precertification hearings is premature"'
and that fair representation issues are best resolved after certification in
unfair labor practice proceedings where employees, rather than employers,
may seek elimination of demonstrable unfair discriminatory practices by
their bargaining representative."" Yet, the Board has allowed for flexibility
in its approach to fair representation issues by stating that it will review cer-
tain discrimination issues in representation proceedings to protect its pro-
cesses from being implicated in unfair representation) 44
Handy Andy perhaps closes the door on the Board's search for a con-
stitutional basis for dealing with union discrimination. Instead, the Board
has returned to an inquiry into fair representation issues rooted firmly in
section 9 of the NLRA. Thus, the Board's treatment of the duty of fair
representation in representation proceedings reinstates the approach de,
veloped in Hughes Tool / and Pioneer Bus.' In short, Handy Andy estab-
'a° Id. For its authority to protect its own processes, the Board in Handy Andy relied
upon Pioneer Bus Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 54, 55, 51 L.R.R.M. 1546, 1546 (1962), where the Board
held that it has the discretionary authority to revoke certification of a union with collective
bargaining agreements which patently discriminate between black and white employees. For a
discussion of Pioneer Bus, see text at notes 70-73 supra.
' 31 228 N.L.R.B. 454, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1361.
138 1(1. See, e.g., Pioneer Bus Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 54, 51 L.R.R.M. 1546 (1962); Sewell Mfg.
Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66, 71-72, 50 L.R.R.M. 1532, 1534-35 (1962) (employer's election victory
overturned clue to employer's racially oriented election propaganda). For a recent Board deci-
sion rescinding certification, see Local 671 (Airborne Freight Corp.), 199 N.L.R.B. 994, 81
L.R.R.M. 1454 (1972) and cases cited therein.
'" 228 N.L.R.B. at 454-55, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1361-62.
'" See Bell & Howell Co., 230 N.L.R.B. No. 57, 95 L.R.R.M. 1333, 1334-35 (June 24,
1977), supplementing 220 N.L.R.B. 881, 90 L.R.R.M. 1448 (1975); Handy Andy, Inc., 228
N.L.R.B. 447, 456, 94 L.R.R.M. 1354, 1363 (1977).
'''' See Handy Andy, 228 N.L.R.B. at 455, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1362; a at 456-57, 94
L.R.R.M. at 1363-64 (Member Walther, concurring); id. at 457-61, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1366-67
(Member Jenkins, dissenting).
"' See Bell & Howell, 230 N.L.R.B. No. 57, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1336; id., 95 L.R.R.M. at
1337 (Member Walther, concurring).
"' See Bell & Howell, 230 N.L.R.B. No. 57, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1336; Handy Andy, 228
N.L.R.B. at 454, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1361.
'" Handy Andy, 228 N.L.R.B. at 454, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1361.
'" See text at notes 74-80 supra.
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lishes that under existing legislation, employment discrimination issues
which are unrelated to the statutory collective bargaining process regulated
by the NLRB should be redressed in other proceedings.'"
The Board's reinstated basic approach to certification proceedings
removes the invitation which existed under the Bekins doctrine for em-
ployers to present discrimination claims in certification proceedings merely
to avoid dealing with employees collectively. It also eliminates the need to
determine whether a union engages in discriminatory membership prac-
tices even if these practices do not effect the representation afforded to
employees in the bargaining unit. By narrowing its approach to the duty of
fair representation questions in representation proceedings, the Board ef-
fectuates its traditional primary functions of fostering collective bargaining
and protecting employees' rights to act concertedly.
B. Unfair Labor Practice Proceedings
In Handy Andy, the Board freely debated whether unfair labor prac-
tice or representation proceedings are the most appropriate forum for de-
ciding certain fair representation issues. Implicit in this debate was the as-
sumption that a breach of the duty of fair representation is an unfair labor
practice. Vet, it was not until its controversial 1962 decision in Miranda Fuel
Co."' that the Board decided that it has jurisdiction to enforce the duty of
fair representation in unfair labor practice proceedings. To this day, the
Supreme Court, though it has accepted this decision for the purposes of
argument,'48 has not upheld it.
In Miranda, a union, under pressure from employees in the bargain-
ing unit, caused an employer to reduce one employee's seniority because of
his early departure for an authorized vacation for reasons not within the
collective bargaining agreement.'" The union's reasons did not appear ar-
bitrary or invidious, though they were wholly unrelated to any union con-
siderations of union membership, loyalty, or activity.'" A three-member
majority of the Board concluded that the union and the employer had
committed unfair labor practices in violation, respectively, of sections
8(b)(1)(A) and 804(2), and 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the NLRA."'
I" See Independent Metal Workers Inca! 1 (Hughes Tool Co.), 211 N.L.R.B. at 149,86
L.R.R.M. at 1334-35 (Chairman McCulloch, dissenting). For discussion of the relationship be-
tween the NLRA and federal employment discrimination policy, see C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOP-
ING LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 740 (Sec-
tion of Labor Relations Law, American Bar Association 1971). There is a considerable amount
of scholarly debate on this point, however. See generally Lopatka, A 1977 Primer on the Federal
Regulation of Employment Discrimination, 1977 U. ILL L. F. 69, 125; Lopatka, Protection Under the
National Labor Relations Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act for Employees Who Protest Discrimi-
nation in Private Employment, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1179, 1224 (1975); Meltzer, The National Labor
Relations Act and Racial Discrimination: The More Remedies, the Better? 42 U. Cm. L. REV. 1, 10
(1974).
140 N.L.R.B. 181, 51 L.R.R.M. 1584 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172, 54
L.R.R.M. 2715 (2d Cir. 1963). For previous litigation, see Miranda Fuel Co., 125 N.L.R.B.
454,45 L.R.R.M. 1l22(1959), vacated and remanded, 366 U.S. 763 (1961).
'48 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182-84 (1967).
140 N.L.R.B. at 181, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1585.
'" See Miranda, 326 F.2d at 175, 54 L.R.R.M. at 2716; see also Miranda, 140 N.L.R.B. at
198, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1593 (Chairman McCulloch and Member Fanning, dissenting).
III 140 N.L.R.B. at 190,51 L.R.R.M. at 1589.
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The majority reached this novel conclusion through a three-step pro-
cess of statutory construction. First, building on the settled premise that a
statutory bargaining representative is charged under section 9 of the NLRA
with the duty to represent employees in the unit fairly and impartially, the
majority concluded that this duty must be "read into" the right guaranteed
employees by section 7 "to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing."15 2 The majority then reasoned that any default by a
union in the performance of' its gection 9 obligations automatically consti-
tutes an infringement of an employee's section 7 rights.'53 Since any union
interference with an employee's exercise of his section 7 rights is an unfair
labor practice, a union which breaches its duty of fair representation com-
mits an unfair labor practice.'" Thus, the majority concluded, section
8(b)(I)(A) of the Act pithibits labor organizations acting in a statutory rep-
resentative capacity from acting against any employee on considerations or
classifications which are "irrelevant, invidious, or unfair."55
Since Miranda, a majority of the Board has adhered to the position
adopted in that case and expanded on it. In Hughes Tool //,'" for example,
the Board held that a union which failed to process an employee's griev-
ance because of his race committed an unfair labor practice. The majority
found that the union's conduct violated not only sections 8(b)(I)(A) and
8(b)(2) but also section 8(6)(3).157 Thus, the Board adopted the theory that
section 8(b)(3), which speaks only of refusals "to bargain collectively with an
employer," prescribes a duty not only to an employer but to employees as
well.
Joined by former Chairman McCulloch, I dissented in Miranda. 158 I
questioned the majority's proposition that a statutory bargaining repre-
sentative's section 9 obligations must be implied in other rights which the
NLRA guarantees employees expressly. While former Chairman McCulloch
"Id. at 185-86, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1587. Section 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970), provides in
part that leImployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join or assist labor or-
ganizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to en-
gage in other concerted activities for the purpose of' collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection ...."
153 140 N.L.R.B. at 184-86, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1586-87.
'54/d. at 185, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1587. 29 U.S.C. § 158(6)(1)(A) (1970) provides in perti-
nent part that '[it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents — (I)
to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the tights guaranteed in section [7] ...."
The majority in Miranda also held that to the extent an employer acquiesces in a union's
request for action against an employee that breaches the union's duty of fair representation,
the employer also commits an unfair labor practice. 140 N.L.R.B. at 185, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1587.
29 U.S.C. §158(a)(1) (1970) provides in pertinent part that "[it shall be an unfair labor prac-
tice for an employer — (I) to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in section [7] ...." The majority also concluded that the union and the-
employer also violate respectively § 8(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1970), and § 8(a)(3), 29
U.S.C. § 15800(3) (1970), if for arbitrary, irrelevant or unfair reasons, "the union attempts to
cause or does cause an employer to derogate the employment status of an employee." 140
N.L.R.B. at 186,51 L.R.R.M. at 1587.
151 140 N.L.R.B. at 185, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1587.
15° Hughes Tool II, 197 N.L.R.B, 1573, 56 L.R.R.M. 1289 (1964). See text at notes 83-87
supra.
'" Id. at 1574-75, 56 L.R.R.M. 1293-94. Section 8(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(6)(3) (1970),
provides that in pertinent part "[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or
its agents ... (3) to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer ...."
158 140 N.L.R.B. at 191-202, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1589-95.
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and I recognized that the Board has broad authority to insure a bargaining
representative's compliance with its fair representation duty in a repre-
sentation proceeding, we did not believe that such authority exists in an
unfair labor practice proceeding.'" Indeed, when Congress amended the
NLRA by adding section 8(b) to regulate unfair labor practices by labor or-
ganizations, it did not mention the duty of fair representation, even though
the Supreme Court had enunciated the duty in Steele nearly three years
earlier. 6° Thus, we would have adhered to the language of section
8(b)(1)(A) and held that a labor organization commits the unfair labor prac-
tice of breaching its duty of fair representation only when it "'restraints] or
coercel ... employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in section 7
"161
• •
We elaborated on these views in Hughes Tool II, again dissenting.'"
There, we argued that making any violation of the duty of fair representa-
tion an unfair labor practice would foster Board intrusion into the internal
affairs of labor organizations.'" The Board consequently would have to
judge the substantive matters of collective bargaining. Since in Hughes Tool
II the grievant's nonmembership was a factor in the union's refusal to pro-
cess his grievance, the Board could have found that the union restrained
and coerced the grievant in violation of 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.'" Chairman
McCulloch and I predicted that, by choosing not to rest its decision on those
grounds, the Board was venturing into a "wholly new field of activity" in
which it would review a wide range of actions by labor organizations under
the general rubric of fair representation.'" That the same result might
have been reached in Hughes Tool II by traditional statutory reasoning
rather than by the majority's "reading in" process illustrates the essential
difference between the approach adopted by the Board and the one I ad-
vocated. Practically speaking, there is much overlap between the two, for
conduct which breaches the duty of fair representation frequently will op-
erate to restrain or coerce union members in the exercise of section 7
rights. Where the majority would import lock, stock, and barrel the
judicially-implied duty into the unfair labor practice field and there expand
upon it, however, I would consider these issues entirely under the existing
mandate committed to the Board by statute. As with consideration of' pre-
certification issues, 166 it is a matter of effectuating the Board's traditional
and primary functions rather than using the Board as an instrument of
every national policy implicated in labor-management relations.
These differences recur in cases involving fair representation issues
arising in the administration of grievance procedures in an established col-
lective bargaining agreement, to which the Board's attention in this area
139 Id. at 200, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1594. See also Hughes Tool II, 147 N.L.R.B. 1573, 1588, 56
L.R.R.M. 1289, 1298-99 (1964) (Member Fanning and Chairman McCulloch, dissenting).
' 6° 140 N.L.R.B. at 201-02 & n.37, 5 L.R.R.M. at 1594-95 & n.37.
'°' Id. at 201. 51 L.R.R.M. at 1594. See also Hughes Tool II, 147 N.L.R.B. at 1586, 56
L.R.R.M. at 1298.
162 147 N.L.R.B. at 1578, 56 L.R.R.M. at 1295.
103 1d. at 1590, 56 L.R.R.M. at 1300.
'm Id. at 1586, 56 L.R.R.M. at 1297-98.
165 See id. at 1590, 56 L.R.R.M. at 1300 (Chairman McCulloch and Member Fanning,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) .
166 See text at notes 145-47 supra.
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has primarily been directed since Hughes Tool 11. 107 These fall into two
types of grievance cases: those where an employee sues a union for acting
unfairly in refusing to process his grievance, and those where an employee
claims a union treated him unfairly in processing his grievance.
In cases involving refusals to process grievances, the determinative
issue is the motivation behind the refusal. Where an employee raises a duty
of fair representation claim regarding a decision not to process his griev-
ance, union considerations often appear to be the motivation behind the
decision and hence these cases can be decided under traditional doctrines.
In Automotive Plating Corp., 188 for example, an employee wanted to grieve
his discharge. The union decided not to process his grievance at all or even
to discuss his discharge with the employer informally. The Board, relying
on evidence that the union's business manager resented the employee's op-
position to an issue discussed at a recent union meeting, found that the
union had violated section 8(b)(1)(A). 169 The union's failure to process the
grievance, the Board reasoned, was in retaliation for union activity and
hence unlawfully restrained the employee in the exercise of his section 7
right to engage in concerted activity.' 7° Clearly the union's refusal to han-
dle the employee's grievance was improperly motivated, and consequently,
the Board did not have to consider directly whether the union breached its
duty of fair representation under Miranda standards.
Similarly, in the recent case of H.O. Canfield Rubber Co.,'" the Board
concluded that a union violated section 8(b)(l)(A) in refusing to process the
grievance of a nonmember employee in the bargaining unit unless he
reimbursed the union for its costs in processing his grievance, where no
such assessment was made upon union members.' 72 The majority, in which
I joined, agreed that the validity of the union's requirement for nonmem-
bers did not turn upon the union's duty of fair representation. Rather, as I
prefer, it turned on whether the union's discrimination against nonmem-
bers restrained or coerced them in the exercise of their section 7 rights.'"
Here again, it was clear that the discrimination against nonmembers was
motivated by improper union considerations — in this case union member-
ship itself. "[A]lthough a union is permitted wide discretion in its handling
'of grievances," we concluded, "a union cannot lawfully refuse to process a
grievance of an employee in the unit because he is a nonmember." 174
' 67 For other Board decisions discussing fair representation issues in the context of con-
tract administration, see Local 324, International Union of Operating Engineers, 226 N.L.R.B.
587, 93 L.R.R.M. 1415 (1976) (job referral information); Barton Brands, Ltd., 213 N.L.R.B.
640, 87 L.R.R.M. 1231 (1974) (dovetailing seniority lists); Local 106, Glass Bottle Blowers
Ass'n 210 N.L.R.B. 943, 86 L.R.R.M.. 1257 (1974), enforced, 520 F.2d 693, 89 L.R.R.M. 3020
(6th Cir. 1975) (locals segregated on the basis of sex); Painters, Local 1066 (W.J. Sielxmoller,
Jr., Paint Co.), 205 N.L.R.B. 651, 84 L.R.R.M. 1013 (1973) (discharge of black employee);
Jubilee Mfg Co., 202 N.L.R.B. 272, 274, 82 L.R.R.M. 1482, 1486 (1973) (Member Jenkins dis-
senting in alleged sex discrimination case).
1 " 170 N.L.R.B. 1234, 67 L.R.R.M. 1609 (1968).
189 Id., 67 L.R.R.M. at 1610.
''° Id. The Board ordered the union to seek the employees reinstatement and to make
him whole for any loss he may have suffered as a result of the discharge. Id. at 1234-35, 67
L.R.R.M. at 1610-11.
'" 223 N.L.R.B. 832, 91 L.R.R.M. 1529 (1976).
172 See text at notes 65-69 supra for discussion of a similar problem arising in a repre-
sentation case, Hughes Tool!, 104 N.L.R.B. 318, 32 L.R.R.M. 1010 (1953).
17" 223 N.L.R.B. at 834, 91 L.R.R.M. at 1531.
174
 Id., 91 L.R.R.M. at 1532.
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Regrettably, the Board has not consistently adhered to its fundamen-
tal statutory role in cases where there has been a refusal to grieve claims.
Local 12, United Rubber Workers,"5 like Hughes Tool II, involved a union's re-
fusal to process the grievances of black employees in the bargaining unit. A
majority again found violations of sections 8(b)(1)(A), 8(b)(2), and 8(b)(3)
on the basis of union's duty not to discriminate against members of a bar-
gaining unit in presenting grievances.'" As in Hughes Tool 11 and Miranda,
Chairman McCulloch and I dissented.'77 We found no statutory basis for
holding that the refusals violated section 8(b)(1)(A). The grievants in the
instant case were union members, and there was no showing that union's
unfair conduct was motivated by union considerations. Therefore, in our
view, the union's conduct was not covered by section 8(b) of the NLRA
even though the conduct may have been racially motivated.'" Invidious as
such conduct may be, we felt that it is not within the scope of statutorily-
defined practices which are given to the Board to regulate.'79
Rubber Workers is nonetheless the exception to the Board's treatment
of refusals to process grievances. In general, the Board has stayed within its
statutory bounds in such cases."° However, in cases where a union actually
has presented and processed a grievance to arbitration, the Board has
ranged further from its statutory mandate. In those cases, the Board is
more apt to rely on Miranda's duty of fair representation principles.'91
However, I would still adhere to the traditional test expressed in 8(b)(1)(A)
ITS I50 N.L.R.B. 312,57 L.R.R.M. 1535 (1964), enforced, 368 F.24 12, 63 L.R.R.M. 2395
(5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967).
"9 150 N.L.R.B. at 317,57 L.R.R.M. at 1537.
"7 Id. at 324, 57 L.R.R.M. at 1540.
"Id. at 325-26,57 L.R.R.M. at 1541.
"9 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit nevertheless accepted the
majority's view that a breach of the duty of fair representation in failing to process a grievance
violates §8(b)(1)(A). Local 12, 368 I.2d 12, 20, 63 L.R.R.M. 2395, 2400 (5th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967). See also Truck Drivers Local 568 v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 137, 141-46,
65 L.R.R.M. 2309, 2311-15 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
199 See, e.g., Local 106, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 210 N.L.R.B. 943, 86 L.R.R.M. 1257
(1974), enforced, 520 F.2d 693, 89 L.R.R.M. 3020 (6th Cir. 1975) (sex); Painters Local 1066
(W.J. Siebenoller, Jr. Paint Company), 205 N.L.R.B. 651, 84 L.R.R.M. 1013 (1973) (race);
Southwestern Pipe, Inc. and United Steelworkers, 179 N.L.R.B. 364, 72 L.R.R.M. 1377 (1969)
(post-strike reinstatement); Houston Maritime, Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. 615, 66 L.R.R.M. 1337
(1967), enforcement denied on other grounds, 426 F.2d 584,74 L.R.R.M. 2200 (1970) (race); Cargo
Handlers, Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. 321,62 L.R.R.M. 1228 (1966) (race); Longshoremen, Local 1367
(Galveston Maritime Ass'n, Inc.), 148 N.L.R.B. 897, 57 L.R.R.M. 1083 (1964) (race); Hughes
Tool II, 147 N.L.R.B. 1573,56 L.R.R.M. 1289 (1964) (race).
In the W. f. Siebenoller case, I joined my colleagues in finding that the union violated sec-
tions 8(b)(I)(A) and (b)(2) in attempting to cause an employer to discharge an employee be-
cause of his nice. I did not rely on Miranda principles. Rather, I did so only because the union
could not "demonstrate that advocation and enforcement of a racially discriminatory hiring
policy serves in any statutorily cognizable way to further the Union's performance of its
statutory representative function." 205 N.L.R.B. at 652 n.4, 84 L.R.R.M. at 1016 n.4. In Glass
Blowers, I joined in the plurality decision finding that a union which maintained locals segre-
gated on the basis of sex restrained and coerced the employees in the exercise of 7 rights in vio-
lation of 8(b)(l)(A). 210 N.L.R.B. at 944, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1259. Thus Glass Blowers does not
rest on duty of fair representation principles enunciated in Miranda.
"'See, e.g., PPG Industries, Inc., 229 N.L.R.B, No. 107, 95 L.R.R.M. 1366, 1369 (May
17, 1977). See also Local 705, International Bhd. of Teamsters (Associated Transport, Inc.),
209 N.L.R.B. 292,86 L.R.R.M. 1119 (1974). See text at notes 192-95 infra for discussion of As-
sociated Transport.
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before finding a violation in any grievance administration case. For exam-
ple, in General Truck Drivers, Local 692 (Great Western Unifreight System), Hz I
concurred specifically to present my, views on the inappropriateness of re-
liance on Miranda in a fact situation involving allegedly unfair grievance
processing.
In Great Western, a union failed to file in a timely fashion an admit-
tedly meritorious grievance, causing an employee to lose his contractual
grievance procedure rights. Countering the employee's subsequent unfair
labor practice complaint, the union argued that its failure to process the
employee's grievance was not an arbitrary refusal but merely a negligent
omission.'" Two members of the Board agreed with the union that some-
thing more than negligence is required to find a breach of the duty of fair
representation under Miranda principles. Mere negligence, in their view,
does not equal "irrelevant, invidious, or unfair considerations" which the
Board in Miranda characterized as arbitrary conduct.'" Accordingly, they
rejected the employee's claim.
While I concurred in this result, I did not agree with the plurality's
analysis for three reasons. First, the plurality stated erroneously that the
Supreme Court has "approved" the Board's Miranda doctrine.'85 To this
day, the Supreme Court has only assumed that a breach of the duty of fair
representation is an unfair labor practice.'" Congress has remained equally
silent as to whether a violation of the duty of fair representation should be
an unfair labor practice.187 Second, I do not believe "that every arbitrary or
putatively 'unfair' act by a union ... (is] automatically an unfair labor prac-
tice proscribed by Congress."888 That proposition unreasonably restricts the
discretion a union should have in exercising its representation function.
Not every intraunion resolution of a seniority question or a grievance
should be subject to the Board's over-the-shoulder appraisal for fairness
when it does not affect the basic economic machinery of labor management
relations which the unfair labor practice provisions regulate.'"
Finally and above all, I disagree with the nearly automatic invocation
of the magic phrase "duty of fair representation" wherever a union en-
gages in alleged misconduct against an employee or a group of employees.
This invocation is immediately followed by citation to Miranda and its im-
precise "irrelevant, invidious or unfair" test for unlawful conduct under
section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.'" The better and perhaps only statutorily
permissible test in cases such as Great Western is "whether or not the Union
restrained and coerced the charging party in the exercise of his section 7
rights by failing to process his grievance in a timely manner."9' In my
view, negligence without some motivation amounting to restraint or coer-
I" 209 N.L.R.B. 446,85 L.R.R.M. 1385 (1974).
"31d. at 447, 85 L.R.R.M. at 1386.
1841d. at 447-48,85 L.R.R.M. at 1386.
''See id. at 447 n.3;85 L.R.R.M. at 1386 n.3.
("See Vara v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 176-78 (1967). See text at notes 39-44 supra.
'" See Hughes Toot H, 147 N.L.R.B. at 1588,56 L.R.R.M. at 1298-99 (Chairman McCul-
loch and Member Fanning, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
1" 209 N.L.R.B. at 449, 85 L.R.R.M. at 1387-88 (Member Fanning, concurring).
1891d., 85 L.R.R.M. at 1388.
li" Id. at 450,85 L.R.R.M. at 1388.
'' Id. But see Penn Industries, Inc., 233 N.L.R.B No. 133, 97 L.R.R.M. 1299 (De-
cember 5, 1977) (adopted trial examiner's findings).
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cion does not satisfy such a test. But despite any objections to the use of
Miranda standards in reviewing union grievance decisions, a majority of the
Board apparently will apply those standards in grievance handling disputes.
I nevertheless agree that once a union undertakes to process an
employee's grievance, it has a duty to present the grievance in the light
most favorable to the employee. Otherwise, the union operates to restrain
the employee in his section 7 right to present grievances. The duty to pre-
sent an employee's grievance in its best light was first articulated by the
Board in Truck Drivers Local 705 (Associated Transport, Inc.), 192 in which I
participated. There, a union agent stated openly in a joint grievance com-
mittee meeting that he did not believe an employee's grievance was valid.
By making this statement, the Board concluded, the agent, and hence the
union, not only had restrained and coerced the employee in the exercise of
his section 7 rights but had breached its duty of fair representation as
well.'" The Board reasoned that once the union undertook the obligation
to process the employee's grievance, it became obligated to represent him
fully and fairly. This obligation included "the duty to act as advocate for
the grievant ... . "194
 To the extent that this holding was grounded on sec-
tion 7 of the NLRA, it is consistent with my position with respect to the
appropriate method of reviewing a union's grievance handling proce-
dures.'"
My objection to the importation of Miranda's irrelevant, invidious, and
unfair conduct standards is based primarily on my view that the Board
should not be involved in a substantive review of purely internal union
matters which have little to do with the protection of employees' right to
organize and bargain collectively and the maintenance of industrial
peace.'" Under Miranda standards, in addition to determining whether ar-
bitrary conduct encompasses merely negligent actions, the Board could be
forced to review a variety of union grievance decisions which might not
reach the level of restraint and coercion under section 8(b), yet seem unfair
or even arbitrary. What about the union which inadequately prepares for
arbitration or ineffectively counsels a grievant? Or a union which decides
not to investigate purported evidence or contact all potential witnesses?' 97
What of the union which agrees with an employer to drop one grievance in
an exchange for favorable settlement of another?'" Despite the unfairness
which might result from such actions, I continue to doubt if it is proper for
the Board to second-guess a union's grievance handling decision in an un-
fair labor practice proceeding if the decision was not improperly motivated
' 92 209 N.L.R.B. 292, 86 L.R.R.M. 1119 (1974). See also United Steelworkers (Inter-
Royal Corp.), 223 N.L.R.B. 1184, 92 L.R.R.M. 1108 (1976).
193 209 N.L.R.B. at 292, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1121.
'"Iel.
1 " 5 See, e.g.; Great Western 209 N.L.R.B. at 4490, 85 L.R.R.M. at 387-88 (Member Fan-
ning, concurring). But see Mass. Laborers' Dist. Council of the Laborers' Intl Union (Manga-
naro Masonry Co.), 230 N.L.R.B. No. 95, 95 L.R.R.M. 1564 (July 5, 1977).
"'See Great Western, 209 N.L.R.B. at 449-50, 85 L.R.R.M. at 1387-88. (Member Fan-
ning, concurring).
'" Cf. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976) (union breached duty
of lair representation by failure to investigate).
'""Cf. Tobias, Individual Employee Suits for Breach of the Labor Agreement and the Union's
Duly of Fair Representation, 5 Tot.. L. REV. 514, 527 n.40 (1974).
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in light of section 7 of the NLILA. How these doubts affect the resolution
of these questions, I cannot, as the current Chairman of the Board, predict.
CONCLUSION
After serving on the Board for almost half its life, I am persuaded
that fair representation issues have posed some of the most difficult prob-
lems it has confronted. Professor Summers aptly described the complexities
and conflicts inherent in duty of fair representation issues; he compared
the Supreme Court's landmark duty of fair representation decision in Paca
v. Sipes to a giant squid having "a number of procedural tentacles, any one
of which may be more than we can master, but with all of which we must
ultimately contend."'" The Board has contended with some of these ten-
tacles, and undoubtedly has not met them all.
As the current Chairman, I am limited to describing the past rather
than predicting the future. This article has not proposed statutory solutions
to some of the conflicting considerations posed by the duty. Instead, I have
discussed the Board's current analytical approaches to fair representation
issues and pointed out what I believe to be the strengths and weaknesses of
these approaches. So, as long as the Board retains its present statutory
mandate, many of the weaknesses will persist. In the meantime, the Board,
in resolving fair representation issues in the future, will continue to balance
competing interests, and when called upon to do so, will fashion fair and
workable rules concerning the duty of fair representation.
" Summers, The Individual Employees Rights Under the Collective Bargaining Agreement:
What Constitutes Fair Representation?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 251, 251 (1977).
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